Does it work?
Two different questions that get answered as one
Question 1 — does upzoning produce buildings? Sometimes, slowly, where demand is strong
and parcels are underbuilt. The Terner Center's first-year count of SB 9 — California's statewide
duplex-and-lot-split upzoning — found Berkeley received 5 unit applications and 1 lot-split application,
none approved, through November 2022. Statewide the pattern was the same: entitlement without
construction, because owner-occupancy rules, design limits and costs made projects not pencil. Yonah
Freemark's 2023 review of roughly 30 studies puts the short-run land-value jump from upzoning at 3–23%
and finds construction follows only when the capacity increase is large, the parcel is underbuilt, and the
market is strong. Portland's 15-year parcel study found an average of eight years from upzoning to
completion. Chicago's transit upzoning produced higher prices and no additional units in five years.
Question 2 — when a building opens, what happens next door? Here the evidence has
converged, and much of it is Bay Area work. Kate Pennington (UC Berkeley economics) used San Francisco
fires as a natural experiment for new construction, 2003–2017: rents within 500 meters fell 1.2–2.3%,
and displacement risk for existing residents fell 17%. Asquith, Mast and Reed looked at 50-plus-unit
buildings in 11 cities including San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle and Portland: rents within two blocks
fell 5–7% relative to trend, and in-movers came from slightly lower-income neighborhoods than before.
Zuk and Chapple at UC Berkeley's Urban Displacement Project found that at the regional scale both
market-rate and subsidized production reduce displacement, with subsidized units having roughly double
the effect — but at the block level in San Francisco, neither did. The City's own commissioned study
(Anti-Eviction Mapping Project) reached the narrower conclusion that affordable production measurably
lowers displacement risk and market-rate production's effect "is not statistically significant."
The exception that matters for D1. Where existing rents are far below the new building's,
the "amenity effect" can win: a Minneapolis study found rents fell 3.2% near new buildings in high-income
areas and rose 6.6% in low-income ones. The blocks west of San Pablo and along Adeline are Berkeley's
version of that case. That is the argument for Ask 04, not an argument against building.
Berkeley's housing target, 2023–2031
8,934
units required by Jan 2031
1,654
permitted through 2024 (18.5%)
28%
of above-moderate target permitted
4%
of lower-income target permitted
~6,000
units in the pipeline, Dec 2025
Sources: City of Berkeley Housing Element Annual Progress Report (March 2025); Building Berkeley
pipeline tally from City permit data. Berkeley's total housing stock is 55,031 units; the City needs
roughly 1,460 permits a year for the rest of the cycle. Staff's corridor capacity figures are ceilings,
not forecasts.
What I could not verify
Berkeleyside reported in May 2025 that many Berkeley asking rents had returned to 2018 levels and in
September 2025 that Rent Board registry data did not support claims of widespread vacancy in new
Downtown and Southside buildings. I could not obtain the underlying registry extract. Those two
stories are consistent with the research above; they are not a Berkeley-specific causal estimate, and
nobody has published one. Ask 03 is how we get it.